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We study the sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol with discrete phase modulation of coherent
states. We first make the security of the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation. We then
present analytic formulas for key rate calculation. We take numerical simulations for the key rate
through discrete phase modulation of both the original SNS protocol and the SNS protocol with
two way classical communications of active-odd-parity pairing (AOPP). Our numerical simulation
results show that only with 6 phase values, the key rates of the SNS protocol can exceed the linear
bound, and with 12 phase values, the key rates are very close to the results of the SNS protocol
with continuously modulated phase-randomization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The theories and experiments of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–19] have been widely studied since the first
QKD protocol was proposed by Bennet and Brassard in 1984 [1]. The secure key rate and the distance are central
issues in practical application of QKD. In particular, the decoy-state method [10–12] improves the relationship between
key rate R and channel transmittance η from square scale, R ∼ O(η2), to linear scale, R ∼ O(η). Recently, the idea
of twin-field QKD (TFQKD) [20] and its variants [21–36] have further improved the key rate to the scale of square
root of channel transmittance, R ∼ O(√η), which can break linear bound [37, 38] of QKD. So far, the TFQKD has
been demonstrated by a number of experiments [18, 39–42].
Among all the variants of TFQKD, the sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol [21] together with its modified
protocols [31, 34, 43] have attracted many attentions due to its large noise tolerance and high key rate. Moreover,
the SNS protocol has a unique advantage that the traditional decoy-state method directly applies, which makes the
finite-key analysis very efficient. The SNS protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in proof-of-principle in
Ref. [39], and realized in real optical fiber with the finite-key effects taken into consideration [18, 40]. Notably, the
SNS protocol has been experimentally demonstrated over 509 km optical fiber [18] which is the longest secure distance
of QKD in optical fiber.
In practice, we need the decoy-state method [10–12] to assure the security of those protocols with imperfect sources.
In the traditional decoy-state method, phase randomization is requested so that the source state can be regarded as
the classical mixture of different photon-number states. However, the perfect phase randomization by continuous
modulation is technically not likely. In a real experiment, the phases of WCS sources are discretely modulated to 2mpiN
where m = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1 and N is always an even number. The major difference between the discrete modulation
and continuous modulation is that the actual states of the latter case are Fock states while that of the former case is
not.
To close the gap between the theory and experiment, we study the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation
of WCS sources. Although the effects of discrete-phase-randomization have been studied for the protocols such
as the traditional decoy-state BB84 [10–12] in Ref. [44], the MDIQKD [45–52] in Ref. [53], the non-post selection
protocol [23, 24] of TFQKD in Ref. [54], no investigation has been done on the SNS protocol. Here we study this
based on the structure of the SNS protocol. We prove it’s security and present the formulas for key rate calculation.
Unlike other protocols with discrete-phase-randomized WCS sources [44, 53–56]. We then present analytical formulas
of the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate and the lower bound of the yield of untagged bits while the prior arte
works have to solve linear programming problems. Our numerical simulation results show that only with 6 phase
values, the key rates of the SNS protocol can exceed the PLOB bound, the linear bound of the key rate established
by Pirandola, Laurenza, Ottaviani, and Banchi [38]. With 12 phase slices, the key rates are very close to the SNS
protocol with continuously modulated phase-randomized WCS sources. Since the property of no bit-flip error in the
untagged bits in SNS protocl still holds with discrete phase modulation, we can directly apply the active-odd-parity
2pairing (AOPP) method proposed in our previous work [31] to improve the key rate. The numerical results show that
the advantage of the AOPP method still holds.
The article is arranged as follows. We first introduce how to perform the SNS protocol with discrete phase modu-
lation of WCS sources. Based on the equivalent entanglement protocol of the SNS protocol, we show how to get the
formula of the phase-flip error rate. We then show how to apply the decoy-state method to obtain the upper bound of
the phase-flip error rate and the lower bound of the yield of untagged bits. Using these bounds, we present numerical
results for both the original SNS protocol and the SNA protocol with AOPP method. The article is ended with the
concluding remarks.
II. THE SNS PROTOCOL WITH DISCRETE PHASE MODULATION OF WEAK COHERENT STATE
SOURCES
A. The protocol
The implementation process of the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation WCS sources is similar to that
of the original SNS protocol [21]. Here we first introduce the 4-intensity protocol as follows. Obviously, the special
case that the intensity of signal state equals to that of one of the decoy state in the 4-intensity makes the 3-intensity
protocol.
For each time window, Alice (Bob) randomly decides it is a decoy window or a signal window. If it is a decoy window,
Alice (Bob) randomly chooses to prepare a pulse of state |0〉, |e2mpii/N√µx〉 or |e2m′pii/N√µy〉 (|0〉, |e2npii/N√µx〉 or
|e2n′pii/N√µy〉), where m,m′, n, n′ are randomly chosen from {0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1} and N is assumed to be an even
number. If it is a signal window, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses to prepare a vacuum pulse or a pulse of state
|e2lpii/N√µz〉 with probabilities 1 − ǫ and ǫ respectively, where l is randomly chosen from {0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1}. If
Alice (Bob) decides to send out a vacuum pulse, that is to say sending nothing or not sending, Alice (Bob) takes the
corresponding classical bit value as 0(1). If Alice (Bob) decides to send out a pulse of state |e2lpii/N√µz〉, Alice (Bob)
takes the corresponding classical bit value as 1(0).
Then Alice and Bob send their pulses to Charlie, Charlie is assumed to perform interferometric measurements on
the received pulses. If only one of the two detectors clicks, Charlie would announce this pulse pair causes a click and
whether the left detector or right detector clicks. Alice and Bob take it as a one-detector heralded event.
After Alice and Bob repeat the above process for many times, they acquire a series of data which are used to
perform the data post-processing.
The first step of data post-processing is sifting. Alice and Bob first announce the types of each time window
they have decided. For a window that both Alice and Bob have decided a signal window, it is a Z window. The
corresponding bits of the one-detector heralded event of the Z windows, which are also called as the sifted key, are
used to extract the final key. Except for the Z windows, Alice and Bob announce the intensities and phases they have
chosen in each window. For a window that both Alice and Bob have decided a decoy window, and the intensity of
the pulse is µx and their phases satisfy
1− | cos(2mπ
N
− 2nπ
N
)| ≤ δ, (1)
where δ is a positive number close to 0, it is an X1 window. Here in our calculation we shall simply set
| cos(2mπ
N
− 2nπ
N
)| = 1 (2)
for the post selection condition of X1 windows above. The data of X1 windows are used to estimate the phase-flip
error rate of untagged bits. The data of other windows are used for decoy-state analysis.
As the phases of WCS pulses in the Z windows are never announced in the public channel, the density matrix of
those WCS pulses is
ρz =
1
N
N−1∑
l=0
|e2lpii/N√µz〉〈e−2lpii/N√µz |. (3)
For convenience, we define the approximated j-photon state |λj〉 in the following form [44]:
|λj〉 = 1√
Pj(µz)
∞∑
k=0
(
√
µz)
kN+j√
(kN + j)!
|kN + j〉, (4)
3and j = 0, 1, 2 · · · , N − 1. It is easy to see that ρz is a classical mixture of different |λj〉. Explicitly, we have
ρz =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µz)|λj〉〈λj |, (5)
where
Pj(µz) =
∞∑
k=0
µkN+jz e
−µz
(kN + j)!
. (6)
For the pulse pairs in X1 windows, if the phases of the pulse pair satisfy n ≡ (m + q)modN where q is a constant
integer, the density matrix of those pulse pairs is
ρX1(q) =
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
|e2mpii/N√µx〉A|e2npii/N√µx〉B〈e−2mpii/N√µx|A〈e−2npii/N√µx|B, (7)
where the subscript A and B indicate Alice and Bob respectively. After a simple calculation, one can find that ρX1(q)
is actually the classical mixture of the state |ϕqj〉,
ρX1(q) =
N−1∑
j=0
PXj(µx)|ϕqj〉〈ϕqj | (8)
where
|ϕqj〉 =
e−µx√
PXj(µx)
∞∑
k=0
kN+j∑
k1=0
(
√
µx)
kN+j√
k1!(kN + j − k1)!
e
2pii
N q(kN+j−k1)|k1; kN + j − k1〉, (9)
and the probability to obtain the state |ϕqj〉 is
PXj(µx) =
∞∑
k=0
kN+j∑
k1=0
µx
kN+je−2µx
k1!(kN + j − k1)! =
∞∑
k=0
(2µx)
kN+j
e−2µx
(kN + j)!
= Pj(2µx). (10)
B. The security analysis
Follow the security proof in Ref. [21], let’s first consider the equivalent entanglement protocol of the SNS protocol.
In the entanglement protocol, for each time window, Alice and Bob pre-share the entanglement state
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0λ1〉 ⊗ |0˜0˜〉+ |λ10〉 ⊗ |1˜1˜〉)
=
1√
2
[
1√
2
(|0λ1〉+ |λ10〉)⊗ 1√
2
(|0˜0˜〉+ |1˜1˜〉) + 1√
2
(|0λ1〉 − |λ10〉)⊗ 1√
2
(|0˜0˜〉 − |1˜1˜〉)],
(11)
where |0˜0˜〉 and |1˜1˜〉 are local states that only exist in Alice’s and Bob’s labs and |0λ1〉 and |λ10〉 are real states that
are sent to Charlie. According to the measurement results announced by Charlie, Alice and Bob can get a series
of almost perfect entanglement state by applying entanglement purification to the local states. Two parameters are
needed in the entanglement purification: the first is the bit-flip error rate in the Z basis, ez, and the second is the
bit-flip error rate in the X basis, eph, which is also the phase-flip error rate in the Z basis. Here the Z basis means
{|0˜〉, |1˜〉}, and the X basis means { 1√
2
(|0˜〉+ |1˜〉), 1√
2
(|0˜〉 − |1˜〉)}. Finally, by measuring the local states in the Z basis,
Alice and Bob can get secure final keys.
As Alice and Bob only concern about the secure final keys, they needn’t have to measure their local states after
Charlie announces his measurement results, but they can just measure their local states before they send the real
states to Charlie. If Alice and Bob each measures their local qubits in the Z basis, it is equivalent to that Alice and
Bob randomly send the pulse of state |0λ1〉 or |λ10〉 to Charlie. If Alice and Bob each measures their local qubits
in the X basis, it is equivalent to that Alice and Bob randomly send the pulse of state |χ0〉 = 1√2 (|0λ1〉 + |λ10〉) or
4|χ1〉 = 1√2 (|0λ1〉 − |λ10〉) to Charlie. As shown in Ref. [21], a phase error happens if Alice and Bob send |χ0〉 to
Charlie and Charlie announces the right detector clicks or Alice and Bob send |χ1〉 to Charlie and Charlie announces
the left detector clicks.
Denote TR0 as the probability that Charlie announces the right detectors clicks while Alice and Bob send |χ0〉 to
Charlie. Denote TL1 as the probability that Charlie announces the left detectors clicks while Alice and Bob send |χ1〉
to Charlie. Denote s1 as the yield of
1
2 (|0λ1〉〈0λ1|+ |λ10〉〈λ10|). We can calculate the phase-flip error rate by
eph =
TR0 + T
L
1
2s1
. (12)
According to the above discussion and the tagged-model, we can define the untagged bits in the real protocol as
the bits in the Z windows that Alice decides not to send and Bob actually sends a pulse of state |λ1〉〈λ1| while Bob
decides to send a WCS pulse with intensity µz, or Bob decides not to send and Alice actually sends a pulse of state
|λ1〉〈λ1| while Alice decides to send a WCS pulse with intensity µz. Finally, we can get the secure final key rate by
R = 2ǫ(1− ǫ)P1(µz)s1[1−H(eph)]− SzfH(E), (13)
where H(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the Shannon entropy, Sz is the yield of the events in the Z windows,
f is error correction efficiency factor, and E is the bit error rate of the sifted keys.
C. The decoy-state method
To clearly show how to apply the decoy-state method to this protocol, we denote Alice’s sources |0〉, |e2mpii/N√µx〉,
and |e2m′pii/N√µy〉 by oA, xA, and yA respectively, and we also denote Bob’s sources |0〉, |e2npii/N√µx〉, and
|e2n′pii/N√µy〉 by oB, xB , and yB. We denote the source of pulse pairs by κAςB, where κ, ς = o, x, y. And for
simplicity, we omit the subscripts. For example, source ox represents that Alice uses the source oA and Bob uses
the source xB . Without phase post-selection, the density matrices of sources xA, yA, xB , yB have similar form with
Eq. (4). Specifically, we have
ρw =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µw)|λwj 〉〈λwj |, (w = x, y), (14)
where
|λwj 〉 =
1√
Pj(µw)
∞∑
k=0
(
√
µw)
kN+j√
(kN + j)!
|kN + j〉, (15)
and Pj(µw) is defined in Eq. (6). Here ρx is the density matrix of sources xA and xB, and ρy is the density matrix of
sources yA and yB.
Denote the yield of sources κς by Sκς . Denote the yield of states |0λwj 〉〈0λwj | and |λwj 0〉〈λwj 0| by Y wvj and Y wjv . In
the original SNS protocol [21], as the continuously modulated phase-randomized WCS sources are used, we have
Y xvj = Y
y
vj , Y
x
jv = Y
y
jv, (16)
but this equality no longer holds in this protocol. Consider the properties of trace distance [44], we have
|Y xvj − Y yvj | ≤
√
1−
(
F jxy
)2
, |Y xjv − Y yjv | ≤
√
1−
(
F jxy
)2
, (17)
where
F jxy =
|〈λxj |λyj 〉|√
〈λxj |λxj 〉〈λyj |λyj 〉
=
∑∞
k=0
(µxµy)
(kN+j)/2
(kN+j)!√∑∞
k=0
µkN+jx
(kN+j)!
∑∞
k=0
µkN+jy
(kN+j)!
, (18)
is the fidelity of states |λxj 〉 and |λyj 〉.
5Denote the yield of states |0λ1〉 and |λ10〉 by s01 and s10 respectively. And we have s1 = 12 (s01 + s10). We can get
the lower bound of s1 by either analytical formula or the linear programming.
Combining the equations
Sox =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µx)Y
x
vj =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µx)Y
y
vj +∆, Soy =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µy)Y
y
vj , (19)
where
∆ =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µx)(Y
x
vj − Y yvj). (20)
we have
Y yv1 =
P2(µy)Sox − P2(µx)Soy − [P0(µx)P2(µy)− P0(µy)P2(µx)]Y yv0 − P2(µy)∆− ξ
P1(µx)P2(µy)− P1(µy)P2(µx) , (21)
where
ξ =
N−1∑
j=3
[Pj(µx)P2(µy)− Pj(µy)P2(µx)]Y yvj . (22)
It is easy to check that ξ ≤ 0 if the following condition holds
P1(µx)
P1(µy)
≥ P2(µx)
P2(µy)
≥ Pj(µx)
Pj(µy)
, j = 3, 4, · · · , N − 1, (23)
which can be easily examined given values of µx and µy. And in our numerical simulation, we found Eq. (23) always
holds. With
Y yv0 ≤ Soo +
√
1− F 20 , ∆ ≤ ∆U =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µx)
√
1−
(
F jxy
)2
, s01 ≥ Y yv1 −
√
1− F 21 , (24)
where
F0 =
1√∑∞
k=0
µkNy
(kN)!
, F1 =
∑∞
k=0
(µyµz)
(kN+1)/2
(kN+1)!√∑∞
k=0
µkN+1y
(kN+1)!
∑∞
k=0
µkN+1y
(kN+1)!
. (25)
We have
s01 ≥ sL01 =
P2(µy)Sox − P2(µx)Soy − [P0(µx)P2(µy)− P0(µy)P2(µx)]
(
Soo +
√
1− F 20
)
− P2(µy)∆U
P1(µx)P2(µy)− P1(µy)P2(µx) −
√
1− F 21 .
(26)
By similar method, we can prove that
s10 ≥ sL10 =
P2(µy)Sxo − P2(µx)Syo − [P0(µx)P2(µy)− P0(µy)P2(µx)]
(
Soo +
√
1− F 20
)
− P2(µy)∆U
P1(µx)P2(µy)− P1(µy)P2(µx) −
√
1− F 21 ,
(27)
if Eq. (23) holds. Finally, we have s1 ≥ 12 (sL01 + sL10).
The remaining task is to estimate the upper bound of phase-flip error rate, eph, which is equivalent to estimate the
upper bounds of TR0 and T
L
1 .
Denote TR+ as the probability that Charlie announces the right detector clicks while Alice and Bob send out the
pulse pairs in the X1 window and their phases satisfy m = n. Denote T
L
− as the probability that Charlie announces
the left detector clicks while Alice and Bob send out the pulse pairs in the X1 window and their phases satisfy
m = (n + N/2)modN . Given the discussion above, we know that the pulse pairs in the X1 window whose phases
6satisfy m = n are the classical mixture of the state |ϕ0j 〉. Thus by denoting tRj as the probability that Charlie
announces the right detector clicks while Alice and Bob send out the pulse pairs of state |ϕ0j 〉, we have
TR+ =
N−1∑
j=0
PXj(µx)t
R
j . (28)
Denote T00 and T
′
00 as the probability that Charlie announces the right detector clicks and left detector clicks while
Alice and Bob send out a vacuum pulse pair. Consider the properties of trace distance, we have
|tR0 − T00| ≤
√
1− F 200, |tR1 − TR0 | ≤
√
1− [F+11(0)]2, (29)
where
F00 =
|〈ϕ00|0〉|√
〈ϕ00|ϕ00〉〈0|0〉
=
1√∑∞
k=0
(2µx)
kN
(kN)!
, (30)
and
F+11(q) =
|〈ϕq1|χ0〉|√
〈ϕq1|ϕq1〉〈χ0|χ0〉
=
√
Re2+ + Im
2√∑∞
k=0
(2µx)
kN+1
(kN+1)!
∑∞
k=0
µkN+1z
(kN+1)!
,
Re+ =
1√
2
∞∑
k=0
(µxµz)
(kN+1)/2
(kN + 1)!
[1 + cos
2π
N
q(kN + 1)],
Im =
1√
2
∞∑
k=0
(µxµz)
(kN+1)/2
(kN + 1)!
sin
2π
N
q(kN + 1).
(31)
Combine Eqs. (28) and (29), we have
TR0 ≤ TR,U0 =
TR+ − PX0(µx)
(
T00 −
√
1− F 200
)
PX1(µx)
+
√
1− [F+11(0)]2. (32)
With similar method, we have
TL1 ≤ TL,U1 =
TL− − PX0(µx)
(
T ′00 −
√
1− F 200
)
PX1(µx)
+
√
1−
[
F−11(
N
2
)
]2
, (33)
where
F−11(q) =
|〈ϕq1|χ1〉|√
〈ϕq1|ϕq1〉〈χ1|χ1〉
=
√
Re2− + Im2√∑∞
k=0
(2µx)
kN+1
(kN+1)!
∑∞
k=0
µkN+1z
(kN+1)!
,
Re− =
1√
2
∞∑
k=0
(µxµz)
(kN+1)/2
(kN + 1)!
[1− cos 2π
N
q(kN + 1)].
(34)
and Im has already been shown in Eq. (31). Finally, we have
eph ≤ T
R,U
0 + T
L,U
1
sL01 + s
L
10
. (35)
With all those formulas, we can now calculate the secure final key rate according to the observed values in the
experiment.
7We have obtained explicit formulas above for key rate calculation. In our calculation below, we shall use our
analytical formulas above. Definitely, the key rate here can be also calculated through linear programming. It is
min s1 =
1
2
(s01 + s10),
s.t. constraints with observed values of number of post selected counts, e.g.
Sox =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µx)Y
x
vj , Soy =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µy)Y
y
vj ,
Sxo =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µx)Y
x
jv , Syo =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj(µy)Y
y
jv ,
|Soo − Y y0v| ≤
√
1− F 20 , |Soo − Y yv0| ≤
√
1− F 20 ,
|Y xvj − Y yvj | ≤
√
1− (F jxy)2, |Y xjv − Y yjv| ≤
√
1− (F jxy)2,
|s01 − Y yv1| ≤
√
1− F 21 , |s10 − Y y1v| ≤
√
1− F 21 ,
(36)
and so on. After we get the lower bound of s1 through linear programming, the remaining process is the same to the
above method.
D. 4-intensity protocol and 3-intensity protocol
The 3-intensity protocol is simply a special case of our 4-intensity above by setting µz = µy.
III. THE NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this part, we shall show some numerical simulation results.
We use the linear model to simulate the observed values [27, 30]. The distance between Alice and Charlie and
the distance between Bob and Charlie is assumed to be the same. The properties of the two detectors of Charlie
are assumed to be the same. The lowest intensities of the sources in the decoy window are set as µx ≥ 0.001 and
µy ≥ 0.002, and the remaining parameters including µz and ǫ are optimized to obtained the highest key rates. The
‘Distance’ shown in the figures of this part means the length of fiber between Alice and Bob. And the experiment
parameters used in our numerical simulation are listed in Table. I.
pd ed ηd f αf
1.0× 10−8 3% 30.0% 1.1 0.2
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numerical simulations. Here pd is the dark count rate of Charlie’s detectors;
ed is the misalignment-error probability; ηd is the detection efficiency of Charlie’s detectors; f is the error correction inefficiency;
αf is the fiber loss coefficient (dB/km).
Figure 1 is the key rate of the SNS protocol with different number of phase values. The cyan curve is the PLOB
bound which is established by established by Pirandola, Laurenza, Ottaviani, and Banchi to measure the linear upper
bound of the key rate of QKD [38]. The key rates are almost coincide for the cases N > 12. Thus the curves for
N > 12 are not listed in this figure. Figure 1 shows that only with 6 phase values, the key rate of the SNS protocol can
exceed the PLOB bound, and with 12 phase values , the key rates is very close to the SNS protocol with continuously
modulated phase-randomized WCS sources.
Figure 2 is the key rate of the SNS protocol with AOPP [31] and different number of phase values, while Figure
3 is the comparison of the key rates of the original SNS protocol and the AOPP method. The AOPP method is an
error rejection process through two way classical communication, which is only related to the sifted keys. As the
property of no bit-flip error in the untagged bits holds in the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulaion of WCS
sources, we can directly apply the formulas got in our previous work [31] to calculate the key rate after AOPP. Figure
3 shows that key rates of the SNS protocol with AOPP exceed those of the original SNS protocol by about 70% in all
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FIG. 1: The key rates of the SNS protocol with different number of phase values. The experiment parameters used in the
numerical simulation are shown in Table. I. The PLOB bound is used to measure the linear upper bound of the key rate of
QKD [38].
distances. While the distance between Alice and Bob is less than 150 km, the key rates of the AOPP method with 6
phase values are even higher than those of the original SNS protocol with 10 phase values.
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FIG. 2: The key rates of the SNS protocol with active-odd-parity pairing (AOPP) [31] and different number of phase values.
The experiment parameters used in the numerical simulation are shown in Table. I. The PLOB bound is used to measure the
linear upper bound of the key rate of QKD [38].
Figure 4 is the comparison of the key rates of the 4-intensity protocol and the 3-intensity protocol. In the 4-intensity
protocol introduced in Sec. II A, µy dosen’t have to be equal to µz. By adding a constraint that µy = µz, we get
the 3-intensity protocol [27], which is a more convenient protocol in the experiments. Figure 4 shows that while the
number of phase values is large, which is closer to the case of continuously modulated protocol, the key rates of the
3-intensity protocol is almost the same as those of the 4-intensity protocol. As the number of phase values decreases,
the key rate gap between the two protocols gradually increases.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have studied the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation. Starting from the security proof,
we obtain analytical formulas of the phase-flip error rate when the discrete phase modulation. With our derivations,
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FIG. 3: The comparison of the key rates of the original SNS protocol and the active-odd-parity pairing (AOPP) method [31].
The experiment parameters used in the numerical simulation are shown in Table. I. The PLOB bound is used to measure the
linear upper bound of the key rate of QKD [38].
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FIG. 4: The comparison of the key rates of the 4-intensity protocol (µy 6= µz) and the 3-intensity protocol (µy = µz). The
experiment parameters used in the numerical simulation are shown in Table. I. The PLOB bound is used to measure the linear
upper bound of the key rate of QKD [38].
we also get the lower bound of the yield of untagged bits. Our numerical results show that only with 6 phase values,
the key rates of the SNS protocol can exceed the PLOB bound, and with 12 phase values, the key rates are very close
to the SNS protocol with continuously modulated phase-randomized WCS sources. The AOPP method proposed in
Ref. [31] can be directly applied here, and the numerical results show that the advantage of the AOPP method still
holds in the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation of WCS sources.
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